In Search of a Vision
There is something paradoxical going on in the state of strategy in most organizations -at least the ones that I have happened to run into. On the one hand, the need for strategy is very real and intense. Companies are facing adverse conditions aggravated by increased competition, lack of growth opportunities, and a depressing capital market. They also require making significant investments in hardware and software technologies whose returns seem to be very elusive. But faced with these realities, the lack of proper strategic thinking seems to impair significantly the development of the organization potentials. And seldom executives know how to get started. In particular, there is the elusive "vision thing". How can we capture the essence of how we want to position ourselves in the marketplace and how to communicate that enthusiastically in and out of the organization. It is a primary concern of this paper to provide the reader with a good understanding of how to accomplish this task.
There are also some other concerns that I feel are critical to apprehend. The new technologies, particularly those around the internet, have allowed us to achieve a degree of interconnection that was never possible with similar ease in the past. This means that the network has become the relevant focus of strategic scope. The firm has to be perceived as part of a coherent system formed by suppliers, customers, and most critically, what we called complementors -firms that deliver products and services that enhance our own product and service portfolio. This constitutes what we refer to as the extended enterprise. No firm can play the game alone, no one can afford to do that effectively. Therefore, a smart vision should be expansive and outwardly-oriented, so that we can leverage all the extensive set of resources which can be intelligently accessed.
At the same time, the technology is allowing us to treat our customers in a singularly individualized way, if we choose to do so.
We can seek a close proximity to the customer and deliver a value proposition that is driven to satisfy the customer specific needs.
This simply means that the customer is placed at the center of strategy and the primary objective is what we refer to as customer bonding: establishing a constructive and enduring relationship based on mutual trust, collaboration, and joint benefits.
Under these new conditions, I am dismissing the old paradigm of perceiving the ultimate goal of strategy as achieving competitive advantage. That is a dangerous fallacy which asserts, either explicitly or implicitly, that strategy is war and the way to win it is to beat our competitors, normally by offering superior products.
What is even more concerning is that often this kind of behavior leads towards the commoditization of the product offering.
By being obsessed about competitors, we tend to imitate them. In turn, this leads to the convergence of the industry where all of the key players begin to respond by following in each other's footsteps.
Imitation leads to sameness, and sameness will never lead to greatness, which is the required characteristic of an outstanding firm.
I believe in three tenets of strategy: First, the achievement of superior economic performance; second, the establishment of customer bonding through a unique an differentiated value proposition; and third, the creation of a spirit of success that is established by attracting and retaining superior talent.
Commoditization attempts against each one of these tenets and should be avoided at all cost. With a commodity business you willn ever enjoy outstanding economic performance; you will never provide unique offerings to your customers; and -most importantly -you will never be able to attract and retain the most valuable talent.
I view strategy as the pursuit of a strong collaboration between the firm as its logical partners, leading toward the establishment of customer bonding. The task is not easy but it could be immensely rewarding. I will describe how to accomplish it and share with you the lessons and experiences I have collected along the way.
The Alternative Strategic Positionings -the Triangle
The three options represented in the Triangle 1 (Figure 1 ) are the starting point of the dialogue for the development of a strong vision. I have found very helpful too present to managers three alternative ways that can accomplish the desired customer bonding.
Although in practice most organizations find themselves in a hybrid situation, it is useful to reflect upon these options as if they were mutually exclusive options, representing very different approaches to managing the business.
At the right-hand side of the triangle is the so-called Best The measure of success is product share, which ultimately can fragment the business activities in a disconnected set of product offerings.
In the left-hand side of the Triangle sits the option we called Total Customer Solutions, which represents a 180 degree departure from the Best Product positioning. Rather than selling standardized and isolated products to depersonalized customers, we are providing solutions consisting of a portfolio of customized products and services that represent a unique value proposition to individualized customers. Instead of acting alone, we engage the relevant set of partners that constitute the extended enterprise.
Instead of engaging in a war of attrition against our competitors, we seek cooperation that establishes the desired customer bonding.
The relevant overall measure of performance becomes the total customer share, whose needs we are attempting to satisfy in as much a comprehensive way as possible. It is not our supply chain that is relevant, it is the combined chain that includes us, the customer, and our key suppliers. It is not our internal product development capabilities that exclusively carry our innovation initiatives, rather it is the joint development efforts particularly with our customers that are central to our success. What guides us is not exclusively our product economics, but it is the customer economics, since we are trying to help the customer in enhancing his or her financial performance.
At the top of the Triangle stands the most demanding strategic option, which we call System Lock-In. In here we are addressing the full network as the relevant scope, the gaining of complementors'
share as the ultimate objective, and the system economics as the driving force. Those who are successful in reaching this position gain a de facto dominance in the market which not only assures them a customer lock-in but also a competitor lock-out. The complementors play a key role because they are the basis for the consolidation of this power. Bill Gates is the richest man in the world not necessarily because he has developed the best product or excels at customer attention, but because he has an army of people working for him who are not on his payroll -all of the application software developers who are writing for the Windows compatible operating systems. Once you reach the lock-in it is hard to be taken away from you because of the so-called network effects, which creates the proverbial virtuous circle: customers want to buy the computer with access to the largest set of applications, and software developers want to write applications for the computers with the largest installed base.
I believe that not every organization has the capacity or the ability to reach a System Lock-In positioning. Nevertheless, the need to consider the full network as the relevant business stage and the pursuit of close linkages with complementors are of great relevance for the development of an effective strategy, no matter which your ultimate goal might be. Moreover, the transformation that a company should undertake to move away from a commoditized Figure 2 we show Sony Wega as offering a differentiated product in TV sets, although the durability of its differentiation is rather debatable. In the low cost position we show two very successful companies in rather mediocre industries:
Southwest in the commercial airline industry, and Nucor in steel.
The fact that these are rather exceptions to the rule serve to underscore the difficulties of achieving successful competition in this corner.
Given the adverse structural characteristics of the Best Product positioning in many situations, one has to wonder why so many companies fall into the trap of accepting this option as the only one where we uncover how our capabilities, complemented with external parties, can generate products, services, and solutions that were not apparent to start with.
The customer does not have power over you. We have talked about the fallacy of viewing strategy as rivalry against your competitors. There are now some who want to make us believe that the most serious antagonistic player is the customer! The idea is that the customer has become more sophisticated and informed, therefore able to transform this knowledge into power to use against you. Our belief is that the relationship with the customer should be based on mutual trust, fairness, and win-win opportunities. This is the most intelligent and the only reasonable way to perform business.
Sales are too important to be left to the sales force. In an extreme form of Best Product organization, the sales force of one organization deals with the purchasing department of the other one.
This clearly prevents the meeting of all of the capabilities of both institutions to reflect upon the way in which those competencies could generate the greatest rewards. For Tier 1 customers, it is imperative that the top executives of both firms meet to decide on the mutually agreeable value proposition. Direct contact of multifunctional teams is at the heart of proper strategy execution.
Technology is too important to be left to the technical staff.
Technology is another critical capability that is often used in a rather narrow way. Often companies limit the use of their technological know-how to imbed it into their products and processes. This works fine if you are deploying a Best Product strategy, but is hugely inadequate in the strategies pertaining to the other corners of the Triangle. The technical knowledge should be paramount to be used as a key component of the design of the customer value proposition. But this is performed through the joint multifunctional teams we referred to in the previous paragraph, as opposed to dealing with it in the solitude of the laboratories.
Technology is an integral part of the business, influencing and being influenced by all of the business subtleties.
Decommoditize Your Business -The Case of Codelco
In the fight against commoditization you have to start at home, by never accepting the premise that your business is a commodity. To make this point as strongly as I can, I refer you to my work with the copper industry.
Some years ago I was called to assist Codelco (Corporación del
Cobre) the largest and most profitable copper company in the world that is owned and managed by the Chilean government. Codelco is an extraordinarily successful company. Just to give you some hard evidence, during the time period covering the years 1990-1995
Codelco had profit margins of 14%, against 7% of the copper industry and 13% of the pharmaceutical industry. What a feast!
The original intent of the assistance that Codelco required was to assess the appropriateness of the existing organizational structure. Codelco executives were very determined that I did not need to look into their strategies, because they were totally confident on the strategic course they had developed based on the following premises: First, copper is a commodity; second, the primary competitors of Codelco were the other copper producers that they easily outperformed; and third, the winning strategy has to be based on developing the most effective cost infrastructure so that they could retain the significant cost advantage they enjoyed, due primarily to the terrific quality of Codelco mining plants. The logic, at first sight, seems impeccable. However it was faulty in the three basic arguments.
First, copper is not a commodity as we have explained previously. If you observe how the customers use the metal in their own products, you realize that copper has infinite possible applications, far from the stereotype of a commodity. Codelco was reaffirming the commoditization of copper by being completely disconnected from the end users. They had six sales people to sell three billion dollars of copper -and they told me that in fact they had two too many. They simply had long-term transactions with metal traders who had no commitment to the copper industry.
Once you begin to understand the specific needs of the end users, you could develop a true strategy to provides unique solutions leading to strong customer bonding.
Second, the major competitors of Codelco were not the other copper producers, but rather those engaged in the delivery of major possible substitutes of copper such as aluminum, steel, plastic, and fiber optics. The aluminum industry had been particularly effective at pursuing a strategy of metal substitution to their advantage. They were successful in replacing the copper-made radiator for an aluminum one in the auto industry, and they are making significant progress in developing a technology that can eventually substitute the steel-made chassis for an aluminum counterpart. The copper producers have been caught off guard in all of their developments because they were not directly connected to their relevant end user.
That is not a very smart way to play the game! Indeed, if you look at this situation from a broader perspective you can realize that not only other copper producers are not your relevant competitors, but rather they should be your complementors. After we successfully began to redirect the strategy of Codelco, we held an unprecedented strategic planning workshop with all of the key copper producers in the world, which were members of ICA, the International Copper Association. The intent was not to use ICA as a cartel to orchestrate the supply of copper and influence its price (as OPEC in the oil industry does), but rather to stimulate the demand for copper in the world, which is a perfectly legitimate and smart thing to do. The ICA meeting included not only copper producers, but also fabricators (which added value by further elaborate copper products) and important end users. This constitutes the network in which the copper industry operates, which should have been all along the proper focus of strategic attention.
Third, it was not enough for Codelco to concentrate exclusively in its own cost infrastructure. As the leader of the industry it was expected to assume a more creative role and a customer-oriented strategy.
The lessons of the Triangle for Codelco can clearly be visualized in Figure 3 . Codelco should not abandon its commitment to a lean cost-effective organization. However it should in addition What I find impacting in this story is that if I can convince you that copper is not a commodity, and the most appropriate strategy for a leading copper company is not to follow blindly the Best Product positioning, then I can really convince you that "Commodities only exist in the mind of the inept" is a very proper statement.
Rethink the Customer Engagement Process -The Case of Castrol
Castrol is one of the leading lubricant companies in the world.
They realized that playing the Best Product strategy was not going anywhere, since the business was getting commoditized and differentiation through premium products was not generating sustainable competitive advantage. Selling lubricants by the gallon was not a very compelling proposition. At that time they were exposed to the Triangle, and decided to mobilize their efforts toward the pursuit of a Total Customer Solutions strategy. Primary Target Segment -Productivity Conscious Customers.
These customers are eager to receive support that will enhance their productivity, reduce total costs, and promote higher sales.
Secondary Target Segment -Cost Conscious Customers. These customers are concerned about total costs but they believe new production does not necessarily yield higher sales or economies of scale.
The Least Desirable Segment -Price Conscious Customers.
These customers are basically buying from the supplier that offers the lowest price.
This kind of customer segmentation is critical because you cannot and should not treat every customer equally. Not all the customers are equally receptive to an approach which requires stronger efforts on both parts, but potentially generating much greater benefits. Castrol's value proposition for the primary targeted customers was as follows:
A customized lubrication solution involving products and services that results in documented cost reductions and productivity improvements.
We have underlined in that statement the words customized, solutions, and documented, because they truly capture the spirit of an offering that has nothing to do with a conventional capabilities that will allow them to customize product offerings, resulting in a more compelling win-win situation.
Tier 2 is composed by regional and local modern-trade retailers, where Unilever can significantly assist in establishing and managing the business through a close partnership that can produce a de-facto customer lock-in.
The third tier includes independent small local retailers, wholesalers, and drug stores which are often fragmented and neglected by the major players. It is here where often one can expect to develop the highest lock-in if we treat the customers in ways that they have never experienced. Critical to this approach is to make accessible to them all the power of modern management systems and IT technology to provide them with the tools for superior management.
The segmentation in the consumer side offers similar types of challenges. Tier 1 identifies the most affluent members of society, highly price insensitive, with sophisticated needs in terms of quality of time, health, physical appearance, and vitality. Tier 2 is the upcoming middle class who aspires to a better standard of living and are driven toward upward social mobility. Tier 3 is the most deprived group of consumers which seek to satisfy basic and essential needs. They not only impose very tough terms to their suppliers, but they also carry generic brands which they can sell at heavy discounts to the operators, since they do not have to incur significant marketing costs that are needed to support a brand. This represents an enormous threat to UBF since its primary strategy resides in the development of strong brands aimed at high consumer recognition and an indisputable guarantee for quality. That strategy does not seem to work in this setting because the operators do not exhibit the brand names of their ingredients. This is what the trade calls the "back-of-the-house" and the "front-of-the-house" brands. Let us take the example of Hellman's mayonnaise, a very important back-of-thehouse brand name. When it comes to, say, Applebee's that brand is lost, the consumer will never know that the mayonnaise she or he is eating is Hellmann's. In other words, the front-of-the-house brand name has disappeared. Not only that, but the broad line distributor will pressure the operator to buy its generic brand name with a 20% discount over the branded mayonnaise, which for all intents and purposes are indistinguishable from each other as far as taste is concerned. Do you get the idea?
We have a ferociously intense rivalry confronting the food producers and the broad line distributors. The distributors are commoditizing the food manufacturing products and are attempting to displace them by pushing their generic products. This is the utmost of a commoditization game. How can UBF assert itself under these conditions? The answer is, as you would have expected, through proper segmentation and distinct and carefully drawn value propositions for each customer segment.
We start the segmentation with the operators, which are the real customer base for UBF. The fundamental concern is not to intensify an already conflicting rivalry, but make every effort to decommoditize the product offering. If the distributors will not push our products, we should make sure that our customers will have all of the incentives to pull them. How to accomplish this is very different depending on how the customer fits in three very distinct tiers. The way to gain a close customer bonding and to guarantee a pull of UBF products over the distributors is to offer Tier 1 customers unique customized products, services, and delivery systems. This is possible due to the strong technical capabilities in food and flavor existing in UBF. For instance we can offer a bloody mary mix to TGI Friday's that is unmatched by any alternative in the market and it is exclusive for them. We can offer a system to cook beans at KFC that assures an exquisite quality, with enormous consistency to be perfectly prepared by an unskilled labor force.
Customization and system delivery is the central value proposition to this tier.
Tier 2. Regional and local restaurant chains. This customer tier includes about 1500 smaller restaurant chains. They are important regional and local restaurants, but they do not have access to the superior managerial infrastructure that the top national chains have. This creates a unique opportunity for a company such as UBF which has the internal competencies to provide customized services to these customers that could fundamentally enrich their business capabilities.
The value proposition is to offer branded products -so as to regain the "front-of-the-house" branding image -supported by a set of customized services that offer product support and corporate management services. The combination of these two types of services is enormously impacting.
Product support includes transferring of culinary expertise, on-site marketing, improving consumer understanding, brand training, menu design, health and safety measures, merchandizing, diet nutrition, chef product preparation, and equipment utilization and training. Corporate management services transfers knowledge in IT linkages, EDI/Bar codes, logistics and material flow management, ABC costings, HR training, and profit modeling capabilities.
The combined effect of these two types of services has the power to produce a customer lock-in in this tier.
Tier 3. Thousands of independents. What remains are the thousands of fragmented small restaurants spaced all over the country. Customers in the two top tiers are served by a direct sales force of UBF, we certainly cannot offer to do that with this tier of customers. The challenge is to try to give as much of the services outlined for Tier 2 customers except that the delivery will be done through tele-services and e-mail services.
The deliver of this strategy is orchestrated by a careful segmentation of three-tier distributors: (1) The corporate broad line -who are critical because of the reach of their coverage; (2) The specialized distribution; and (3) The smaller national, regional and local distributor. The intent is to make a close alignment between the distributors' objectives and UBF strategy, and to establish close collaboration with Tiers 2 and 3 distributors to make them legitimate complementors. What is intriguing about this case is that, at first sight, it looks as an impossible puzzle to resolve. The role of technology, therefore, should be to contribute to customer bonding, which is the basic premise that I am advocating. Solutions strategy is to use the broadly available Internet protocols and infrastructure to inextricably link the customer to the firm, rather than using proprietary internally oriented software. B2B is particularly effective to connect the firm with its extended enterprise -customers, suppliers, and key complementors -; B2C does the job to connect the firm with its final consumers.
Finally, the role of IT in a System Lock-In positioning is to facilitate the integration, efficiency, and compatibility of the network of complementors -the entire system is the one which is subject to a full interface.
Once again, the tasks become more demanding and complex as we progress through the Triangle, but the pay-offs cannot be compared.
To summarize, the use of technology is heavily dependent upon the strategy we are pursuing. Technology devoid from strategy often leads to great disappointments.
Beware of the Organizational Structure Implications
The transformation that takes place after the business is repositioned from a Best Product to a Total Customer Solutions requires fundamental changes in all dimensions of management.
We need to review the firm's policies and strategies, the kind of people we attract, the way in which responsibilities are assigned, the form of rewarding employees, the systems to support their work, the metrics used to monitor performance, and the supporting culture of the place.
In my experience, the most effective approach to deal with all these challenges is to adopt the back-end/front-end organizational structure.
2 By doing so we are attempting to preserve the efficiency that characterizes the Best Product-driven organization, while at the same time securing the proximity to the customer that is essential for the Total Customer Solutions strategy. While the back-end allows us to concentrate on product efficiency, the front-end focuses on customers, customer segments, channels, industries, and geographies; namely all of the dimensions that are part of market segmentation. It often happens that firms develop strong capabilities in the back-end but are not equally balanced in the front-end. This is all part of the pervasive productcentric mentality that I have alluded to throughout the paper. The customer marketing activities involve the ability to develop and price bundles of products and services to address the specific needs of individual customers, the careful selection of direct or indirect channels, and the support to be given to the sales force. The proximity of the customer allows the accumulation of superior knowledge about customer needs which translate into a mutually beneficial and constructive relationship with the customer.
As I have said repeatedly, this new state of management development is not straightforward to deploy successfully. There is much ambiguity to resolve among the roles of back-and front-end managers. However, I am convinced it leads to a superior form of organizational structure, much richer in its content and more effective in the execution of a customer-centric strategy.
Achieving Your Potential
In summary, remember one major concept: The way to win is not to beat your competitor but to bond with your customer. If you follow this advice, it will change the way you do business in a much more constructive way. Table. The market-to-book ratio compares the value that shareholders place on the business based upon their assessment of the expected future cashflows relative to the past resources that have been committed to the business. In other words, if a total of $1 million has been invested in a business that today is valued at $2 million, then the market-to-book ratio is 2. Obviously, the strategy and execution of the business has a multiplier effect that creates the additional value. The empirical data shows that the System Lock-In companies have an M/B ratio that is on average twice as large as the Best Product companies. The Total Customer Solutions companies have an average M/B that is 20% higher than that of the Best Product firms (see Table) .
We have found a significant financial premium for companies that can achieve a Total Customer Solutions position, and a further enhanced premium for those attaining System Lock-In. However, there are important caveats. This conclusion reflects the performance of companies that have successfully arrived at these positions, it does not account for those that have attempted and failed. There may be added risk and greater difficulty in reaching the ultimate performance with System Lock-In or to successfully overcome the challenges attached to Total Customer Solutions. 
